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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
When the Federal Arbitration Act' (FAA) was enacted in 1925, it
was meant to strengthen commercial associations' internal arbitrations.2
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Development, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
** I would like to thank the attorneys of the firm Freking & Betz in Cincinnati, OH
for their thoughtful comments.
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In the years since its passage, the type and number of arbitrations have
increased exponentially. In part, this increase is due to the fact that
predispute arbitration agreements are now widely used for consumer
contracts and many employment agreements.3
Another reason for the dramatic rise in the number of arbitrations is
a change in the United States Supreme Court's attitude toward
arbitration. Fifty years ago, the Court held that a securities buyer with a
statutory claim against a seller could not be compelled to arbitrate his
claim pursuant to an arbitration clause in the sales contract.4 Twenty
years later, after the Court held that an employee's arbitration of a
contractual discrimination claim did not preclude subsequent litigation of
his independent statutory rights under Title VII,5 lower courts refused to
compel arbitration of statutory claims in employment disputes.6
However, in the Mitsubishi Trilogy, 7 the Supreme Court stated, "by
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, the party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."8 The Mitsubishi
Trilogy concerned statutory claims arising under antitrust, securities, and
racketeering laws.9 The unanswered question in the Mitsubishi Trilogy,
whether employees can arbitrate employment statutory claims, was
answered in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
10
"In Gilmer the Court held for the first time, that predispute
arbitration is enforceable even when statutory discrimination rights are at
issue."11  Robert Gilmer was a terminated financial services manager
who sued Interstate claiming age discrimination under the Age
1. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
2. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 933-44 (1999).
3. This article uses the terms "predispute arbitration" and "mandatory arbitration"
interchangeably.
4. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
5. See Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974); see also
Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's
Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 336 (2006) [hereinafter Bales, Normative
Consideration].
6. See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184,187 (1st Cir. 1989).
7. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Co. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Co., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
8. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
9. See Rodriguez de Quias, 490 U.S. at 478; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222;
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 619-20.
10. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
11. Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 5, at 338 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
35).
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Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).12 Gilmer had an
agreement, as required by the New York Stock Exchange, to arbitrate
any dispute arising from his employment or termination. 13  When
Gilmer's case went before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, the court compelled Gilmer to arbitration because it
found nothing in the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements.' 4 The Supreme Court agreed
with the Fourth Circuit and compelled Gilmer to arbitration. 15  The
Supreme Court used the Mitsubishi Trilogy for support, finding statutory
claims are arbitrable under the FAA.'
6
Despite the fact that the Court in Gilmer found no congressional
intent in the history of the ADEA to preclude arbitration of an ADEA
claim, the ADEA was enacted in 1967, and at that time, arbitration was
the adjudicating forum for labor and commercial disputes only.'7 It is
likely that when Congress created the ADEA it never considered that
statutory claims would be resolved by arbitration rather than in court.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently, and with bipartisan unity,
endorsed arbitration whether it is by predispute or post-dispute
agreement.
Scholars, commentators, plaintiffs' lawyers, and some members of
Congress have not shared the Supreme Court's endorsement of
compulsory arbitration, particularly for statutory discrimination claims
and consumer disputes. Many employees, as a condition of employment,
must sign mandatory arbitration contracts and consumer contracts often
contain hidden arbitration clauses.
As Congress continues to create new employment and consumer
laws, arbitration of disputes continues to expand. However, Congress
has not changed the FAA to keep up with the expansion and to answer
the new horizons opened up by legislation and judicial fiat. As a result
of this situation, an amended FAA is long overdue.'
8
This article proposes amending the FAA to ensure more equitable
arbitration contracts and procedures. An amended FAA will save time
12. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24. The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(2000).
13. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
14. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
15. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
16. Id. at 26.
17. Wilko was controlling law at the time. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
18. An amendment to the FAA was proposed in Congress by Senator Russ Feingold
in July 2007. This bill proposes to ban all forms of mandatory arbitration for consumer,
employment, and franchise contracts. See The Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), S. 1782,
110th Cong. (2007) and H.R. 3010, lllth Cong. (2009). The bill is currently in
subcommittee.
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and expense in predispute contract enforcement litigation. Part II of this
article will briefly describe why the FAA should be amended. Part III
will describe proposed changes regarding contract formation. Finally,
Part IV will focus on other changes needed beyond contract formation in
providing a fair arbitration procedure, such as picking neutral arbiters,
adequate discovery, and not severely limiting statutes of limitation.
II. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FAA
The FAA is not explicit as to what constitutes an enforceable
predispute contract or what makes for a fair proceeding. Because this
article focuses on how Congress should amend the FAA, it presupposes
several points. First, for some employees and consumers, the present
state of predispute arbitration agreements is not entirely fair. Some
predispute contracts have the hallmarks of adhesion contracts, with
inadequate consideration and unfair terms. 9 Because those employers
and corporations that use these contracts do so for the majority of their
employees and consumers, and these entities arbitrate many more claims;
predispute arbitration may favor these repeat players.20 Moreover, these
arbitration agreements often are presented to employees and consumers
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, often in a context in which the employee or
consumer has no real option other than to take it. This situation has led
some to conclude that forced arbitration is inherently unfair.
21
Second, this article presupposes that without predispute arbitration,
court dockets would be overloaded with claims. In many cases civil
litigation can take years to reach the trial stage. In addition, workers and
consumers with relatively small claims and little resources are more
likely to get dispute resolution in the alternative forum.22 This is because
some employees' potential recovery does not justify the investment of an
experienced labor and employment attorney in litigation preparation. 3
Third, this article presupposes that employers and corporations that
want to use predispute arbitration would rather have fair and equitable
agreements than have Congress eliminate mandatory arbitration
completely. This article takes the approach of recognizing both
19. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 373 (6th
Cir. 2005) (discussing why the lower court denied Ryan's motion to compel arbitration).
20. For a statistical study on the repeat player effect, see Lisa B. Bingham, On
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223 (1998).
21. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's better Than It
Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 787 (2008).
22. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563
(2001).
23. See St. Antoine, supra note 21, at 791-92.
1084 [Vol. 113:4
2009] How CONGRESS CAN MAKE A MoRE EQUITABLE FAA
arguments for and against mandatory arbitration and attempts a solution
that keeps predispute arbitration but makes it more equitable.24
A. Why Changes in Arbitration Must Come From Congress
Although section 2 of the FAA expressly permits courts to revoke
arbitration contracts on grounds that support "revocation of any
contract, ' '25 the Supreme Court has pieced together a federal preemption
doctrine under the FAA and "has exhibited singular determination in
upholding t[his] federal policy on arbitration., 26  First, the Court
interpreted the FAA to preempt any conflicting state laws that
specifically target arbitration agreements.27 Later, it firmly established
that state legislatures cannot enact laws that restrict, directly or
indirectly, arbitration agreements.28 The Court has routinely held that the
FAA trumps state laws dealing with arbitration.29  Because the FAA
preempts state laws in this way, Professor Thomas Carbonneau states
that "the FAA-in reality-is the national American law of
arbitration."
30
The current Supreme Court is enamored with arbitration in a way
that even several successive Obama appointees are unlikely to change.
Therefore, changes in how to interpret the FAA are unlikely to come
from the Supreme Court, at least in the near term. Because the Court will
not do it and the Court has determined that state legislatures cannot do it,
any reform of the current system regarding enforceable contracts and
procedures governing arbitration must come from Congress, and the one
route Congress should consider is amending the FAA.
B. Why Congress Should Amend the FAA
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA to permit judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements covering contract disputes between parties of
roughly equal bargaining power. 3' The Court has stressed that arbitration
24. This article does not address post-dispute arbitration or predispute arbitration
agreements under collective bargaining agreements.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2005); see also Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in
Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 422 (2006).
26. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION xix (2d ed.
2007).
27. See id.; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
28. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Cassorotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("Congress
precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status .... ).
29. See Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326, 326 (2007).
30. CARBONNEAU, supra note 26, at 80.
31. Richard A. Bales & Christopher Kippley, Extending OWBA Notice and Consent
Protections to Arbitration Agreements Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J.
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is an extension of the parties' "consent not coercion. ' 32  But scholars
have consistently argued that the current state of mandatory arbitration is
unfair and has given power to employers and corporations to displace the
judiciary's role in enforcing both common law claims and statutory
rights.
33
Even defenders of mandatory arbitration agree that the statute needs
to be updated to add legitimacy to the public's view of arbitration as a
means of resolving disputes.3 n An amended FAA will make arbitration
agreements easier to draft and enforce.35 Also, an attorney drafting an
arbitration agreement arguably is under an ethical obligation to draft a
fair agreement and an amended FAA could eliminate any potential
conflict. 36 Amending the FAA would provide consistency to enforceable
agreements and ensure parties are accorded due process through
equitable procedures.
When considering due process as to arbitration procedure, Congress
may want to look at the work begun by the Employment Due Process
Protocol. The Protocol was developed under the Dunlop Commission in
1993, which found that labor arbitration was fair to employees because it
was a product of the union's presence, but that non-union employees
lacked this protection.37 The Commission then asked the National
Academy of Arbitrators to draft a list of standards for arbitration
agreements to resolve statutory employment claims. 38  The Protocol
recommended standards to help individual employees in the arbitration
process; for example, it states that an employee has the right to a
spokesperson and access to information relevant to the employee's
claims.39 It also developed criteria for arbiter selection. n One of the
10, 11 (2007); see also Matthew W. Finkin, Workers' Contracts Under the United States
Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
282, 296 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 176-80
(2004).
32. See Bales & Kippley, supra note 31, at 12; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
33. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33,
36-37.
34. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 26, at 75.
35. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
165, 176 (2005) [hereinafter Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten].
36. Id. at 177. See also Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment
Arbitration Agreements after Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 780
(2003).
37. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten, supra note 35, at 171.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 172.
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goals of the Protocol was to create a level playing field for employees
and employers.
The Protocol, as important as it was, is now, like the FAA, out of
date. Courts are faced with issues that the Employment Due Process
Protocol drafters never anticipated. 41  Although the adoption of the
Protocol by American Arbitration Association (AAA) and Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) was an important step, not
all arbitrations are conducted by AAA or JAMS. Not all employers use
providers that use the Protocol, some employers choose less expensive
providers and other less scrupulous employers prefer a for-profit "sham
provider. 'A 2 In Walker v. Ryan Family Steak Houses, Inc., the Middle
District of Tennessee found that the arbitration provider, EDSI, "relie[d]
on the favor of its employer-clients for its livelihood., 43  For those
employers that choose providers that use the Protocol, the Protocol does
not address important issues such as what constitutes adequate discovery,
whether employees can meaningfully participate in the selection of
arbiters, and the enforceability of contracts that limit remedies.
44
Despite the Protocol's problems, it did recognize that non-union
employees need additional protection in arbitration. Yet, the FAA has
remained relatively unchanged since its 1925 form. Currently the statute
is too thin, primarily in the areas of contract formation and due process
procedures, to provide adequate protection to employees and individual
consumers.
III. CONTRACT FORMATION CHANGES
4 5
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract., 46 The Supreme
Court in Gilmer held that arbitration agreements should be enforced
absent "the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
40. See id.
41. Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol, Recent Trends in Employment
Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 301, 302-03 (2007).
42. Id. at 340.
43. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses. Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924 (M.D.
Tenn. 2003).
44. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten, supra note 35, at 190-91.
45. I have extensively discussed arbitration contract formation issues in depth
elsewhere and therefore will include only an abbreviated version here. See, e.g., Bales &
Kippley, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent Protections to Arbitration, supra note
31; Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 25; Bales,
Beyond the Protocol, Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration, supra note 41.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2005).
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provide grounds for revocation of any contract. 4 7 But the Supreme
Court has provided little guidance as to when an employment agreement
is so unfair that it should not be enforced because enforcement would
undermine a substantive statutory right.48 Lower courts have had
difficulty articulating what defines enforceable arbitration agreements.49
A. Problems with the Current Standard
In the mandatory arbitration context, the two most cited contract
formation issues are notice and consent. The FAA should be amended to
provide explicit notice and consent requirements for consumers and
employees who sign predispute arbitration agreements.
1. Lack of Notice
One fundamental problem with the notice requirement is that
although the FAA's section 3 requires courts to stay judicial proceedings
for "any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing.. .,"o courts find the FAA does not require that the writing be
signed by the parties. 51  This loophole has led some employers and
corporations to provide "notice" of mandatory predispute arbitration
through website postings, e-mails, regular mail, paycheck envelopes,
office memoranda, and employee handbooks.52 While some courts have
found website postings are not enforceable, that loophole in the FAA
must be closed. Requiring the writing to be signed by the parties would
provide the consumer or employee with actual knowledge of the
arbitration contract.53 What is more, if employers are required to
disclose up front the terms of the arbitration, they are more likely to
police themselves to ensure that the terms are at least marginally
equitable. Few employers want to develop a reputation among their
employees as high-handed and grossly unfair.
An example of an employer providing poor notice is Campbell v.
General Dynamics Government Systems Corp., in which the employer
sent its employees a mass e-mail containing the arbitration agreement
47. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
48. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 25, at
434.
49. Id.
50. See 9 U.S.C § 3 (2005).
51. See Tinder v. Pinkerton Security, 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Valero Refining, Inc. v. M/T Lauberhom, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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rather than having the employees sign a more traditional paper contract.54
The First Circuit found that the employer could not produce evidence
that its employees possessed actual knowledge of the arbitration contract;
this knowledge could include any affirmative response, such as clicking
a box on the computer screen. 55 The court found that this particular e-
mail was insufficient to alert the employees that they were entering into a
contract, but the court did not hold that emails were invalid notices per
se.
56
While Campbell was decided in 2005, in today's workplace,
acknowledgements on websites, especially internal intranets, are even
more common. Clicking a box in response to a mass e-mail should not
be considered sufficient notice. For today's employee or consumer, a
click on a box does not have the same gravitas as signing a paper
contract. Because the FAA does not provide an adequate notice
provision, the statute should clearly articulate what constitutes notice for
an arbitration agreement so that a person cannot accidently agree to an
arbitration contract via an internet acknowledgment.
Furthermore, an amended FAA should clarify that actual notice to
an individual who is illiterate or who does not speak English requires
something more than the individual's signature on a document he or she
could neither read nor understand. Recently, the Third Circuit found in
Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., that a non-English speaking worker
was bound by the terms of the company's arbitration agreement even
though a fellow worker, at the employer's instance, translated the whole
agreement for the applicant except for the arbitration clause.57 The
majority found that failure to understand or explain an arbitration
agreement does not constitute the kind of "special circumstances" that
relieves an employee from the contract's obligations.58 It found that
even though it was "sympathetic to Morales' situation," the company did
not misread or misrepresent the agreement, and the incomplete
translation was due to the employee's failure to request any explanation
or translation.59 The dissent, however, found that the agreement lacked
mutual assent, particularly when the company inserted itself between the
worker and the contract.60 The dissent's rationale was that when a
54. 407 F.3d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Bales, Contract Formation Issues
in Employment Arbitration, supra note 25, at 437.
55. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555-56.
56. Id.
57. Morales v. Sun Constructors Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2008).
58. Id. at 222 (citing Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101
(D.D.C 2004)).
59. Id. at 223 n.2.
60. Id. at 225 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (noting similar facts in Am. Heritage Life Ins.
Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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translation is provided by the other party, that worker would have no
reason to suspect that the translation was incorrect or incomplete.61
2. Consent
An interrelated but equally troubling issue, particularly in the
employment context, is consent. Consent is easy for an employer or
corporation to demonstrate; a party's acknowledgement that he or she
read and agreed to the contract will suffice. 62 If the employee can show
an affirmative act by the employer to impede understanding of the
agreement, a court may find the contract unenforceable.
63
Consent issues sometimes occur when the arbitration clause is
64buried in fine print or amid pages of documents. Related consent issues
include an undue pressure to sign, the hurried presentation of
agreements, and a misrepresentation of the effect of the agreement on the
employee.65 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Walker v. Ryan's Family
Steak Houses, Inc. addressed several of these issues. 66 In Walker, the
employee's manager explained that "the arbitration agreement meant that
if [the plaintiff] ever had any problems with Ryan's, she 'had to go
through Ryan's before [she] could go to an attorney."' 67 When it comes
to presentation of the agreements, context may well determine
enforceability. 68 For example, in Walker, during the hiring interview, the
manager hurriedly presented prospective employees with various
documents that they were told to sign to be considered for the job.69
Also, the court stated that the manager rarely explained the arbitration
agreement, nor were the applicants allowed to take the agreement home
and review the forms.
70
61. Id. at 226.
62. See Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 22,
at 442.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 443; see also Nargrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 401 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir.
2005) (enforcing arbitration clause found on the twenty-fifth page of a thirty-page
franchise agreement).
65. See Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 25,
at 444-46.
66. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 2005).
67. Id.
68. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 25, at
442; see also Walker, 400 F.3d at 374 (finding that employees that needed to sign without
explanation and without mentioning the arbitration agreement was not an enforceable
agreement). But see Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (finding that employees that were told to sign their names about seventy-five times
in a "tense" atmosphere was enforceable).
69. Walker, 400 F.3d at 373-74.
70. Id. at 374.
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Scholars and commentators have shown particular interest as to
whether a "knowing and voluntary" standard applies to employees that
agree to arbitrate statutory claims,
71 but circuits are split on this issue.
72
Some circuits find that because an employee has a constitutional right to
a jury trial, waiving that right must come from a "knowing and voluntary
waiver., 73 Other circuits have held that it would be inconsistent with the
FAA and Gilmer to apply the knowing and voluntary standard to
enforcing arbitration agreements.74
The above examples represent just some of the concerns of
mandatory arbitration in contract formation.75 By amending section 2,
the FAA should clearly define that a written contract with adequate
notice of a waiver of rights is the minimum required to make an
enforceable contract.
B. A Proposed Amendment to Section 2
The current FAA section 2 reads as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
71. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, supra note 22, at
449.
72. Compare Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986)
(right to a jury trial is a fundamental right; "[w]here waiver is claimed under a contract
executed before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those courts that have held that
the party seeking enforcement of the waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary
and informed"), with Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091,
1098 (E.D. Mich. 1996) ("[A] party is generally chargeable with knowledge of the
existence and scope of an arbitration clause within a document signed by that party, in the
absence of fraud, deception, or other misconduct that would excuse the lack of such
knowledge."). See generally Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing and
Voluntary Consent in Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting
Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
73. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L 685, 694 n.55 (2004) (citing to Leasing
Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986); Westside-Marrero Jeep
Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D. La. 1999)).
74. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.1998);
Beauchamp, 918 F.Supp. at 1098.
75. Other concerns include unilateral modifications. See Richard A. Bales &
Michael L. DeMichele, Unilateral Modification Provisions in Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63 (2006) (arguing that individuals may lack
understanding about what a predispute agreement to arbitrate really means); see also Jean
Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648-49
(2005).
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of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
76
A new paragraph should be added:
(b) No predispute arbitration clause is valid or enforceable in an
employment or consumer contract unless the document within which
the clause is contained meets all of the following requirements:
(1) The document contains knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to litigate all claims, including statutory rights, covered by
the clause;
(2) The document contains notice to the signing parties of the
rules regarding the arbitration procedure;
(3) The document advises the employee or consumer to consult
an attorney prior to signing;
(4) The document contains notice informing the employee or
consumer of the right to revoke the agreement within seven
days of signing it;
(5) The document is signed by all parties; and
(6) The document is written in a manner meant to be understood
by all parties signing it. Should a party be unable to read, an
audio tape recording of the document must be given to the party
at the time the document is signed. Should a party be unable to
read the document because the party cannot understand that
language, a complete translation must be provided before the
document is signed.
(c) The document may not be unilaterally modified.
Even if section 2 of the FAA is amended to cure problems with the
contract formation aspect of mandatory arbitration, numerous other
changes are needed to ensure the process itself is fair to employees and
consumers.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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IV. DUE PROCESS CHANGES BEYOND CONTRACT FORMATION
An enforceable contract does not necessarily guarantee the
arbitration process itself will be fair. The Dunlop Commission and the
Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, which
drafted the Due Process Protocol, adopted a number of procedural
guarantees in employment arbitration. 7  Although the Protocol was
influential, issues remain that the drafters either could not anticipate or
chose to avoid. These issues include: arbiter selection, discovery, and
limitation of remedies.78
The FAA does not provide a mandate for arbitration procedure. For
this reason, arbitrations are inconsistent and sometimes unfair to
employees and consumers. To provide a fair and consistent procedure
the FAA should be amended to provide neutral arbiter selection, provide
for adequate discovery, forbid prospective class action waivers, outlaw
severely limiting statutes of limitation, and ban any limitations on
statutory remedies.
A. Problems with Procedure in the FAA
Codifying an equitable procedure is fundamental in providing
protection for employees and consumers in arbitrations. Providing a
neutral but knowledgeable pool of arbiters is essential. Discovery must
be adequate, particularly in employment disputes. Also, some rights
should not be prospectively waived. These include a right to a class
action, shortened statutes of limitation, and a waiver of statutory
remedies.
1. Arbitral Selection
Arbitral selection is still a hot topic for scholars and plaintiffs'
advocates alike. The FAA provides a backwards-looking protection for
bias. As the Supreme Court stated in Gilmer, quoting section 10(b), the
FAA "protects against bias, by providing that courts may overturn
arbitration decisions where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators. '79  This does not prevent, however, a pre-arbitration
77. See U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
(1994); TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING
OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995) (reprinted in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
IERM 534:401 (1996)); see also St. Antoine, supra note 21, at 797.
78. See generally Bales & Kippley, supra note 31.
79. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2008)); see also 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(b) (2008).
1093
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
challenge when the entire arbitrator selection process itself is
fundamentally unfair. 80 A party should not have to go through the
arbitration first and then allege bias in post-arbitration judicial review.
8'
Codifying a fair arbitrator selection process in the FAA would eliminate
both pre and post judicial review and would deter bad actors that
continue to abuse the system.
Some scholars and employment attorneys see possibilities for abuse
in arbitration selection or at least a lack of consistency. Anecdotal
evidence and a perusal of the ABA employment arbitrators' roster
indicate the dearth of neutral arbitrators available. Arbitral selection is
complex; scholars have identified several inter-related factors that could
influence selection including the repeat player effect, submerged bias,
and employer-appointed panels.
The repeat player effect is simply that employers and corporations
are likely to arbitrate more than one case over time while individuals
usually arbitrate only once. 82 This situation grants an advantage to the
employer or corporation because those entities are more familiar with the
potential pool of arbitrators, which allows the entity to more easily select
a favorable arbitrator.83 Another advantage, sometimes unintentional, is
called submerged bias. This bias occurs when an arbitrator's interest in
being hired by the employer or corporation in the future predisposes the
arbitrator to favor that organization rather than the individual. 4
Empirical research studies have attempted to track the repeat player
effect,85 but the findings are equivocal.86
The most flagrant problem with arbitral selection is when an
employer reserves to itself, in the arbitration contract, exclusive or
inordinate control in selecting the arbitrator or creating the pool of
arbitrators. The Sixth Circuit has found that even if a panel consisted of
80. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 385 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting McMullen v. Meijer Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004)).
81. Id.
82. Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 5, at 383.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223, 224 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham & Simon Sarraf,
Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence That
Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Employment
Arena, PROC. OF N.Y. UNIV. 53RD ANN. CON. ON LAB. 303 (2001); see also Elizabeth
Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, Disp. RESOL. J. (May-
July 2003).
86. See Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 84, at 321-25; see Bales, Normative
Consideration, supra note 5, at 384.
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some of the most respected arbitrators in the region, when the employer
still has exclusive control in creating the pool of arbitrators, that
agreement is unenforceable.87
The Protocol considered a standard procedure whereby the parties
select from a panel list compiled by a neutral agency such as AAA.
88
However, even this standard procedure has problems. Within the AAA's
acceptable list, there are current practicing- employment advocates. A
currently practicing advocate is likely to see the issues framed in his or
her worldview, and has current relationships with local counsel. It is
unlikely that most attorneys who have defended employers or
represented employees for twenty years can one day flip an internal
switch and become truly "neutral."
In the AAA rules, a plaintiff or defendant can strike a practicing
attorney, but this gives the parties fewer arbitrators to choose from in the
remaining pool. One problem with statutory employment cases is that
they are complex and need experienced attorneys or former judges to
arbitrate. 89 The Protocol's guideline provides that the procedure should
include "a jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law."90 But
some mandatory arbitration contracts do not follow the Protocol. 91
The FAA should be amended so that all arbitrations with statutory
employment claims, even those not following the Protocol, provide the
best potential neutral pool of arbiters and that the neutral pool should not
include currently practicing employment law advocates.
2. Discovery
The FAA provides little guidance, aside from stating that the arbiter
has subpoena power and should not unfairly restrict the parties from
presenting relevant evidence on how the arbitration proceeding's
discovery should be conducted. 92 Discovery is at the heart of today's
litigation and it is essential in employment discrimination suits. For
arbitration to be seen as a fair alternative to litigation, full and fair
discovery must be available to the participants.
The Due Process Protocol provides little guidance on the minimum
standard needed for discovery. Many courts allow arbitration clauses
that give the arbitrator discretion to limit discovery, but do not enforce
87. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2005).
88. St. Antoine, supra note 21, at 801.
89. This is also a concern for litigators in forum selection.
90. See Bales, Beyond the Protocol, Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration,
supra note 41.
91. See Walker, 400 F.3d at 373.
92. David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How "Mandatory"
Undermines "Arbitration," 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 404 (2007).
1095
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
those clauses that impose absolute limitations or forbid discovery
completely.93 However, discovery can take many forms. Interrogatories,
although relatively inexpensive, rarely provide the kind of information
needed to develop pretext. To develop discriminatory pretext, deposing
the decision-makers is essential. How much discovery is adequate varies
from case to case.
Some arbitration procedures do not allow for depositions at all. For
example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"),
94
which regulates stock brokers and makes them sign mandatory
arbitration agreements regardless of employment, does not allow
depositions in arbitration, except in statutory discrimination claims.95
Absent statutory discrimination claims, FINRA's Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes only allows depositions if the party can
show extraordinary circumstances, such as when a witness is ill or
unavailable.96  FINRA's exception for depositions in statutory
discrimination claims is a relatively recent change to its code.
97
FINRA's "no deposition rule" also applies to whistle-blower retaliation
claims, making it difficult for the attorney to adequately prepare for a
whistle-blower case, particularly when proving pretext.
98
Employees need information from decision-makers, supervisors,
and sometimes co-workers to fully develop disputed facts. Without
adequate discovery, including depositions, an employee is not afforded a
fair process and the lack of information impedes employee statutory
rights when trying to prove pretext.
93. See Bales, Beyond the Protocol, Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration,
supra note 41, at 333.
94. FINRA is the successor to the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"). See FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last vistited Mar.
3, 2009).
95. See FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE R. 13510 (2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/finramanual/rules/rl3510/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). Note that
FINRA recently changed its rules regarding statutory discrimination claims, which do not
require mandatory predispute arbitration through FINRA. See id. R. 13201. FINRA
does provide special rules if the parties agree, including agreeing to arbitrate either before
or after the dispute arises. See id. R. 13802.
96. Id. R. 13510.
97. The special rules for statutory employment disputes are interesting as they
provide for a lower filing fee than for other disputes; have specific criteria for the panel
of arbitrators; allow for depositions; allow for attorneys' fees and any remedy allowable
under the law. See id. 10210 et seq.
98. See, e.g., Bahravati v. Josenthal, Lyon, and Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir.
1994) (employee arbitrated a whistleblower retaliation and defamation claim against
former employer).
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3. Class Action Waivers
To resolve the current state of the law concerning class action
waivers, the FAA should be amended to ban prospective class action
waivers. Courts currently are split on the enforceability of such clauses.
Even where courts are inclined to find the clauses unconscionable or a
burden on the vindication of statutory rights, the parties seeking
invalidation still bear the burden of proof.99
A case on point was decided by the California Supreme Court
which provided factors for courts to consider in evaluating a waiver, but
did not categorically ban all class action waivers. l 00 In Gentry v.
Superior Court, the court held that "class arbitration waivers cannot,
consistent with the strong public policy behind [California's wage and
hour statute], be used to weaken or undermine the private enforcement of
overtime pay legislation by placing formidable practical obstacles in the
way of employees' prosecution of those claims."10 1  Other courts,
however, have consistently enforced class action waivers with no
restrictions.
With the exception of wage and hour cases, class action waivers
appear more often in the consumer context, but courts are inconsistent as
to whether these provisions are unconscionable.10 2 Some courts in these
consumer cases argue that companies are using these waivers to avoid
liability on meritorious claims, leaving consumers without an appropriate
remedy. 10 3 For these reasons, the FAA should be amended to forbid
class action waivers, because waiving this right prospectively is not
appropriate for mandatory arbitration.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that class claims should
be arbitrated. As Thomas Doyle and Mark Irvings have pointed out,10 4
99. Nagrampa v. Mailcorps, 469 F.3d 1257, 1298 (9th Cir. 2006); Sherr v. Dell Inc.,
2006 WL 210936, at *3 (S.D.NY 2006); see also St. Antoine, supra note 21, at 807.
100. Gentry v. Sup. Ct., 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007).
101. Id. at 569.
102. Compare Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E. 2d 250, 267-68, 274-75
(Ill. 2006) (holding that a mandatory arbitration provision was substantively
unconscionable because the cost of pursuing the claim would likely equal or surpass the
amount the consumer could recover, therefore leaving the consumer without an effective
remedy in any forum), with Wong v. T-Mobile USA, No. 05-73922, 2006 WL 2042512,
at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2006) (holding that, under similar facts, a class action was
essential to vindicating the consumer's statutory cause of action where the statute on
which the claim was based expressly provided for class recovery, regardless of whether
the waiver provision was unconscionable).
103. See Wong, 2006 WL 2042512 at *4.
104. Thomas A. Doyle, Practical and Ethical Issues Involving Non-Party Class
Members in Class Arbitrations, Paper presented at the American Bar Association, Section
of Labor & Employment Law, Midwinter Meeting of the Committee on ADR in Labor
and Employment Law (Feb. 15-18, 2009); Mark Irvings, panel presentation at same.
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class arbitration of employment claims can create difficult ethical issues
for arbitrators. A judge in class-action litigation often must decide which
of several competing lawyers will serve as class counsel. 0 5 An arbitrator
faced with the same decision may have a conflict of interest. If the
original class counsel chose the arbitrator, and/or advanced arbitration
fees, this would create at least the appearance that the arbitrator is likely
to favor that candidate.
Similarly, when a class action lawsuit settles, the trial judge must
ensure that absent class members receive a fair settlement° 6"-i.e., that
class counsel have not colluded with the defendant to sell out the class in
exchange for large attorneys' fees. An obvious conflict of interest occurs
if this role must be played by an arbitrator
who has been retained by, and paid by, the parties in a lengthy
arbitration. That role may be even more awkward if the arbitrator has
to make a fee award to Class Counsel out of a common fund from a
settlement; worse still, the arbitrator may have to decide whether that
common fund should reimburse Class Counsel for arbitration
expenses (including the arbitrator's own fees) that Class Counsel
advanced during the course of the proceedings.
07
For this reason, Congress should additionally consider either
requiring that all class actions be litigated, or should create special
safeguards (e.g., by permitting interlocutory certification to a federal
judge) for class-wide arbitration.
4. Limitations Periods
Courts have been inconsistent as to whether an arbitration
agreement can contractually shorten the claim's statute of limitations. 1°8
Whether the provision offends public policy is the touchstone as to
whether the limitation is enforceable. Furthermore, the type of claim
asserted is relevant, as the Western District of Michigan found in
Conway v. Stryker Medical Division.09 The court held that an arbitration
provision that effectively imposed a six-month limitation on a claim
brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA")
105. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).
106. Thorogood v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2008).
107. Doyle, supra note 103, at 10.
108. Compare Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an arbitration agreement that imposed a one-year statute of limitations was
unenforceable), with Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 230-32 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that an arbitration agreement that imposed a one-year statute of
limitations was not unenforceable per se).
109. No. 4:05-CV-40, 2006 WL 1008670 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
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was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 110 But in a consumer
contract case, the Middle District of Florida found, quoting the Eleventh
Circuit, that the shortened period should be enforced, because "such an
agreement does not conflict with public policy but, in fact, more
effectively secures the end sought to be attained by the statute of
limitations."1 11
The FAA should be amended either to forbid making the statute of
limitations on arbitral claims shorter than it otherwise would be if the
claim were litigated, or to provide that the statute of limitations on
arbitrated claims will be a minimum of one year. A one-year time period
would not burden employee rights as employees are already confined to
180-day periods for filing charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.1 2 For other disputes, one year may be shorter
than some state law contract statutes, 1 3 but one-year limitation periods
are not uncommon.' 4 Because statutes of limitations may completely
foreclose the parties' rights to any adjudication, limitation periods
significantly shorter than those most state legislatures have deemed
appropriate are too short for mandatory arbitration contracts.
5. Limitations on Remedies
Professor Theodore St. Antoine argues that "[i]t is hard to imagine
any provision in an arbitration agreement that would seem more contrary
to public policy than one preventing the full relief authorized by an
applicable statute."' 15 But there is a circuit split on the issue as to
whether a party can agree to waive the right to a full statutory remedy.
1 6
Normally this takes the form of a contractual limitation on the
arbitrator's authority to award relief.
1 17
The Seventh Circuit takes the position that parties can contract for
whatever terms they want. Judge Posner, in his usual colorful style,
states:
110. Id.at*1.
111. Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings LLC, No. 3:07-CV-918, 2008 WL 150479
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008) (quoting Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d
1337, 1341 (1 lth Cir.2005)).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
113. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (West 2008) (providing that breach of
contract for sale claims must be brought within four years; however, the parties, by
agreement, may limit this period to no less than one year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (2008)
(providing a three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract).
114. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.245 (West 2008).
115. St. Antoine, supra note 21, at 808.
116. Id. at 809.
117. Bales, Beyond the Protocol, Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration, supra
note 41, at 335.
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Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more
doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to
whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their
disputes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of••118
arbitration as they are to specify any other terms in their contract.
Fellow Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook goes ever further
and believes a party, absent a statutory anti-waiver provision, could agree
to waive a right even as significant as the full statutory remedy.1 19
The majority of circuits, like the Sixth, sever the offending
provision and allow the arbitrator to offer the full statutory remedy
despite the contract. 120 In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit held that in enforcing the parties' arbitration agreement, the
plaintiff would be forgoing her substantive rights to all the remedies
available under Title VII.121  The court held that the provision
undermined the remedial goal of the statute to make plaintiffs whole for
the injuries suffered because of discrimination.
122
Other circuits offer different solutions, including striking the
arbitration clause altogether and allowing the claims to go to court.123
Some courts sever the claim for relief and allow the court to resolve the
remedy portion after the arbitrator makes an award. 124  Based on the
Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration as a substitute for a judicial
forum, the FAA should be amended to explicitly provide that arbitration
agreements cannot waive statutory remedies.
B. How FAA Section 2 Should be Amended Beyond Contract
Formation
In addition to the proposed FAA amended section 2 provided in part
111(B) of this article, section 2 should add:
(d) No predispute arbitration clause is valid and enforceable in an
employment or consumer contract unless the clause provides for the
following procedural requirements:
118. Bahravati v. Josenthal, Lyon, and Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
119. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law
and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 363, 393-94 (2007).
120. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 670-75 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that an arbitration agreement that limited back pay damages was
unenforceable).
121. Id. at 670.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'l L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2003).
124. See, e.g., DiCristi v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp. 947, 953-54
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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(1) A jointly selected neutral arbitrator familiar with the
applicable law;
(2) In employment disputes, a neutral arbitrator may not have
represented the views of employees or employers within the last
three years, or must have a practice in which the arbitrator
represents both employers and employees on a roughly equal
basis;
(3) Adequate discovery;
(4) Cost sharing to be split between the claimant and
respondent, unless the party with greater resources pays a
disproportionate share of the cost and the other party so agrees;
(5) The right to representation by a person of the claimant's
choice, including the right to recoup attorney's fees if allowed
by law;
(6) The right to remedies that are equal to those provided by
law;
(7) The right to pursue a class or collective action;
(8) A written opinion with award, a statement of the law
applied, and reasons for the award;
(9) A minimum one year statute of limitation for all claims; and
(10) Limited judicial review.
(e) Any party found by a court of law to be in willful violation of this
section shall be assessed a penalty which includes:
(1) The contract is unenforceable;
(2) A private right of action providing the aggrieved party the
right to equitable relief, and
(3) Civil penalties no greater than $100 a day to a maximum of
two years for which the contract was in force.
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V. CONCLUSION
Amending the FAA is long overdue. Because individuals are
waiving valuable rights, codifying the appropriate contract terms will
ease drafting, minimize litigation, and provide a more uniform standard.
Providing, in the statute, the minimum due process required for
adjudication of claims will be more equitable for individuals. It will also
provide more transparency and deter bad actors. It is up to Congress to
update the FAA to provide a fair alternative to litigation for individuals
to resolve disputes.
